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TATE and national laws collide when foreign factors appear in a
lawsuit. Nonresident litigants, incidents outside the forum, parallel
lawsuits, and judgments from other jurisdictions can create
problems with personal jurisdiction, choice of law, and the recognition of
foreign judgments. This article reviews Texas conflicts cases from state
and federal courts during the Survey period from October 1, 2005,
through November 30, 2006. The article excludes cases involving federal-
state conflicts, intrastate issues, such as subject-matter jurisdiction and
venue, and conflicts in time, such as the applicability of prior or subse-
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quent law within a state. State and federal cases are discussed together
because conflict of laws is mostly a state-law topic, except for a few con-
stitutional limits, resulting in the same rules applying to most issues in
state and federal courts.'
I. CONFLICTS AT LARGE IN TEXAS-AN OVERVIEW
In the conflict-of-laws surveys from 2002 through 2005, this Article at-
tempted to cover the broad range of conflicts issues dealing with every
aspect of personal jurisdiction, choice of law, and cross-border judgment
recognition and enforcement. Although no data is readily available to
confirm this, Texas is no doubt a primary state in the production of con-
flict-of-laws precedents. This results not only from its size and population
but also from bordering four states, from being a civil-law nation, and
from hosting international shipping. Only California shares these factors,
with the partial exception of the states bordering Quebec. Texas courts
experience every variety of conflict-of-laws litigation. In addition to a
large number of opinions on common examples of personal jurisdiction, 2
Texas courts produce case law every year on internet-based jurisdiction,3
1. For a thorough discussion of the role of federal law in choice-of-law questions, see
RUSSELL WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICr OF LAWS 649-95 (4th ed. 2001).
2. The Texas Supreme Court's only opinion on personal jurisdiction during the Sur-
vey period was a per curiam reversal of the lower courts' assertion of jurisdiction, in an
insurance claim, over a nonresident parent corporation whose only Texas contacts related
to its acquisition of the subordinate insurer. See Commonwealth Gen. Corp. v. York, 177
S.W.3d 923, 925-26 (Tex. 2005). Other personal jurisdiction cases during the Survey period
are too numerous to report here. A few of the more noteworthy legal discussions (in
addition to the internet cases discussed infra note 3 and the forum-clause cases cited infra
note 4) are: Hoffmann v. Dandurand, 180 S.W.3d 340, 352 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2005, no
pet.) (denied jurisdiction in action against Chicago resident for claim regarding stock
purchase rights in Chicago-based company); Huynh v. Nguyen 180 S.W.3d 608, 627 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.) (upholds jurisdiction for claim by Texas medical
patients against California health care providers for claims arising in California); The Paul
Gillrie Inst., Inc. v. Universal Computer Consulting, Ltd., 183 S.W.3d 755, 764 (Tex..
App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 2005, no pet.) (upheld jurisdiction over Florida-based trade
publication for defamation action); Credit Commercial de France, S.A. v. Morales, 195
S.W.3d 209, 223 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2006, pet. denied) (denied jurisdiction for class
action by Mexican nationals against foreign defendants for alleged complicity in the failure
of Sharp Financial, a Texas corporation owned by Mexican nationals); Doe v. Roberts, 198
S.W.3d 466, 475 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2006, no pet. h.) (reversed lower court and found
general jurisdiction over retired priest living in Ohio for alleged sexual assaults in Missouri,
based on links to Dallas diocese); Bergenholtz v. Cannata, 200 S.W.3d 287, 297 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 2006, no pet.) (jurisdiction denied in Texas residents' legal malpractice claim
against California attorneys regarding a lawsuit in California); Berry v. Lee, 428 F. Supp.
2d 546, 564 (N.D. Tex. 2006) (finds personal jurisdiction against two employers, one in
South Korea and the other in the People's Republic of China, for sexual harassment and
assault claims allegedly occurring in Asia); Sarmiento v.Producer's Gin of Waterproof,
Inc., 439 F. Supp. 2d 725, 733 (S.D. Tex. 2006) (found jurisdiction for claim by migrant
workers against Louisiana employer).
3. Schexnayder v. Daniels, 187 S.W.3d 238, 249 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2006, pet.
dism'd w.o.j.) (rejected internet arguments but upheld specific jurisdiction on other con-
tacts); Karstetter v. Voss, 184 S.W.3d 396, 405 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2006, no pet.) (dismissed
enforcement of Kansas default judgment based on lack of Kansas jurisdiction); Paolino v.
Argyll Equities, L.L.C., 401 F. Supp. 2d 712, 732-33 (W.D. Tex. 2005) (jurisdiction denied
as to all parties in action arising from interstate loan); AdvanceMe, Inc. v. Rapidpay LLC,
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prorogating and derogating forum-selection clauses, 4 federal long-arm
statutes with nationwide process, 5 international forum non conveniens,
6
450 F. Supp. 2d 669, 674 (E.D. Tex. 2006) (found jurisdiction for patent-infringement
claim); EpicRealm Licensing, LLC v. Autoflex Leasing, Inc., Nos. 2:05-cv-163-DF, 2:05-
CV-356-DF, 2006 WL 1984223, at *7 (E.D. Tex. 2006) (jurisdiction denied in patent-in-
fringement action); Action Tapes, Inc. v. Weaver, No. CIV. 3:05-CV-1693H, 2005 WL
3199706, at *3 (N.D. Tex. 2005) (jurisdiction denied in case arising from eBay transaction);
Flowserve Corp. v. Midwest Pipe Repair, L.L.C., No. 3:05-CV-1357-N, 2006 WL 265521, at
*4 (N.D. Tex. 2006) (jurisdiction upheld in action for misappropriation of confidential in-
formation); Moore v. Harney Hardware, Inc., No. H-05-4054, 2006 WL 1342820, at *3
(S.D. Tex. 2006) (jurisdiction upheld in patent-infringement case); Pettus v. Combs, No.
SA-06-CA-0028-XR, 2006 WL 1677778, at *4 (W.D. Tex. 2006) (jurisdiction denied in defa-
mation case).
4. Prorogating forum clauses support the immediate forum's jurisdiction, while dero-
gating clauses designate a forum other than the immediate forum. The distinction is im-
portant. In prorogation cases (where plaintiff has filed in the parties' earlier-chosen
forum), the issues will turn mostly on contract law-if the clause is contractually valid,
defendant has consented and waived amenability arguments. In derogation cases (where a
forum clause designates a place other than the immediate forum), defendant's arguments
will often include not only the enforceability of the forum clause under contract principles,
but also an attack on amenability to the immediate forum. Well-drafted forum clauses are
not litigated often in prorogation settings and are generally upheld. See, e.g., Swanscan,
LLC v. Whetstone, No. Civ-A H-05-3306, 2006 WL 492161, at *4 (S.D. Tex. 2006) (uphold-
ing Texas forum clause); Taisheng Int'l Ltd. v. Eagle Maritime Servs., Inc., No. Civ.A. H-
05-1920, 2006 WL 846380, at *5 (S.D. Tex. 2006) (upholding ambiguous Texas forum clause
in bill of lading); XPEL Techs. Corp. v. Maryland Performance Works Ltd., No. SA-05-
CA-0593-XR, 2006 WL 1851703, at *7 (W.D. Tex. 2006) (upholding Texas forum clause).
However, they are sometimes denied. See, e.g., PCC Sterom, S.A. v. Yuma Exploration
and Prod. Co., Inc., No. 01-06-00414-CV, 2006 WL 2864478, at *7 (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 2006, no pet. h.) (rejecting Texas forum clause). The opposite is true of derogat-
ing forum clauses. See, e.g., William Noble Rare Jewels v.Christie's Inc., 231 F.R.D. 488,
491-92 (N.D. Tex. 2005) (honoring New York forum clause); Nicolas v. MCI Health &
Welfare Plan No. 501, 453 F. Supp. 2d 972, 974 (E.D. Tex. 2006) (rejecting forum clause
designating Washington, D.C. or Loudon County, Virginia); Braspetro Oil Servs. Co.-
Brasoil v. MODEC (USA) Inc., 423 F. Supp. 2d 680, 682 (S.D. Tex. 2006) (honoring forum
clause designating Brazil); Dominguez v. Finish Line, Inc., 439 F. Supp. 2d 688, 691 (W.D.
Tex. 2006) (rejecting arbitration clause designating Indianapolis, Indiana, and requiring
parties to meet to agree on more reasonable site for arbitration); Gutermuth Invs., Inc. v.
Coolbrands Smoothies Franchise, L.L.C., No. 5A-06-CA-0471 RF (NN), 2006 WL 2933886,
at *3 (W.D. Tex. 2006) (honoring forum clause designating Suffolk County, New York);
BBC Chartering & Logistic Allcaps & Co., KG v. Suzlon Wind Energy Corp., No. H-05-
04128, 2006 WL 1007524, at *3 (S.D. Tex. 2006) (rejecting forum clause designating
Hamburg, Germany); In re Talent Tree Crystal, No. 01-05-00686-CV, 2006 WL 305015, at
*3 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (honoring forum clause designating fed-
eral courts in Houston where a parallel case was pending); Prosperous Maritime Corp. v.
Farwah, 189 S.W.3d 389, 393-94 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2006, no pet.) (rejecting contract's
selection of Bombay, India, as situs for wrongful death suit); Int'l Demographics, Inc. v. SF
Newspaper Co., No. H-06-0342, 2006 WL 1897042, at *10 (S.D. Tex. 2006) (successor to
defendant not sufficiently tied to forum clause to be bound), affd, No. 06-20657, 2007 WL
1676984 (5th Cir. June 12, 2007).
5. See, e.g., Verizon Employee Benefits Comm. v. Jaeger, No. 3:05-CV-1860-L ECF,
2006 WL 2880451, at *4-5 (N.D. Tex. 2006) (applying 29 U.S.C. § 1132 regarding ERISA
claims); Yearby v. York Casket Co., No. H-06-1719, 2006 WL 1900647, at *2 (S.D. Tex.
2006) (denies application of 15 U.S.C. § 22 to antitrust action, although the court's analysis
that federal long-arm statutes merely reiterate the minimum-contacts test and require suffi-
cient contacts with Texas appears to be erroneous, see id. at *1, contradicting Verizon's
analysis, 2006 WL 2880451 at *3).
6. See, e.g., Perforaciones Maritimas Mexicanas S.A. de C.V. v. Seacor Holdings, Inc.,
443 F.Supp.2d 825, 835-36 (S.D. Tex. 2006) (dismissal sought for forum in Mexico; denied
as moot after lengthy analysis and other dispositive rulings); Seung Ok Lee v. Ki Pong Na,
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parallel litigation,7 international family-law issues,8 and private lawsuits
against foreign sovereigns. 9 The range of issues with annual examples is
similar for choice of law. International judgment enforcement and inter-
state judgment enforcement offer fewer annual examples, 10 possibly a
sign of the subject's administrative nature that results in only a few re-
ported cases.
Texas state and federal courts provide a fascinating study of conflicts
issues every year, but the volume of case law now greatly exceeds this
Survey's ability to report on them. Accordingly, this Survey period's arti-
cle focuses almost entirely on choice-of-law issues, with only this brief
reference in the introduction to personal jurisdiction and judgment
enforcement.
198 S.W.3d 492, 493 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2006, no pet.) (reversed trial court's dismissal of
divorce action for refiling in Korea); Gomez de Hernandez v. Bridgestone/Firestone N.
Am. Tire, L.L.C., 204 S.W.3d 473. 483-84 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2006, pet. denied)
(dismissed for refiling in Mexico).
7. "Parallel litigation" refers not merely to lawsuits having some or all issues being
litigated in related actions, but instead to the determination of motions for relief from
pending multiple litigation, either by staying or dismissing the instant action or by en-
joining the other litigation. See, e.g., In re State Farm Mutual, 192 S.W.3d 897, 903 (Tex.
App.-Tyler 2006, no pet.) (Texas action stayed pending outcome of Louisiana case);
AutoNation, Inc. v. Hatfield, 186 S.W.3d 576, 582 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2005,
no pet.) (injunction against employer proceeding in Florida suit); In re Talent Tree Crystal,
No. 01-05-00686-CV 2006 WL 305015, at *4 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.)
(dismissing case in deference to parallel action in federal court); Youngblood v. JTH Tax
Servs., Inc., No. SA:06-CA-380-XR, 2006 WL 1984656, at *5 (W.D. Tex. 2006) (transferred
to be consolidated with action in the Eastern District of Virginia); 4052898 Manitoba, Ltd.
v. Titan Oil and Gas, Inc., No. CIVASA05CA31505NN, 2006 WL 617953, at *10-11 (W.D.
Tex. 2006) (transferred to be consolidated with action in the Central District of California).
8. See, e.g., Seligman-Hargis v. Hargis, 186 S.W.3d 582, 587 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2006,
no pet.) (no child custody jurisdiction because of superior contacts with Germany); Ruffier
v. Ruffier, 190 S.W.3d 884, 890 (Tex. App.C El Paso 2006, no pet.) (no child custody juris-
diction because of superior contacts with Belarus and Argentina); Kogel v. Robertson, No.
03-04-00246-CV, 2005 WL 3234627, at *1 (Tex. App.-Austin 2005, no pet.) (mother fled
to Belgium with child in violation of Texas custody order); Boyo v. Boyo, 196 S.W.3d 409,
414 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2006, no pet.) (Texas divorce between Nigerian nationals, in-
cluding ancillary claims against a Nigerian company for diversion of community assets).
9. See, e.g., Af-Cap, Inc. v. Republic of Congo, 462 F.3d 417, 425 (5th Cir. 2006)
(attempted judgment enforcement failed); Evans v. Petroleos Mexicanos (PEMEX), No.
05-20434, 2006 WL 952265, at *2 (5th Cir. 2006) (denied jurisdiction over foreign-govern-
ment-owned corporation); Doe v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Galveston-Houston, 408 F.
Supp. 2d 272, 282 (5th Cir. 2005) (denied jurisdiction over Pope Benedict XVI and the
Holy See); Wahba v. Nat'l Bank of Egypt, 457 F. Supp. 2d 721, 735 (E.D. Tex. 2006) (de-
nied jurisdiction over government-owned bank).
10. Foreign country judgments include: Af-Cap, 462 F.3d at 425 (lacked jurisdiction to
garnish assets); FG Hemisphere Assocs., LLC v. Republique du Congo, 455 F.3d 575, 596
(5th Cir. 2006) (denied enforcement because targeted property was not subject to the
court's jurisdiction); Motalvo v.Park Drilling Co. of S. Am. Sucursak Ecuador, No. H-03-
1745, 2006 WL 1030012, at *4 (S.D. Tex. 2006) (enforcement denied because Ecuadoran
document did not qualify as judgment); Interstate judgment enforcement actions include:
Karstetter v. Voss, 184 S.W.3d 396, 405 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2006, no pet.) (dismissed en-
forcement of Kansas default judgment based on lack of Kansas jurisdiction); Navarro v.
San Remo Mfg., Inc., No. 05-04-01511-CV, 2006 WL 10093, at *4 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2006,
no pet.) (Wisconsin judgment enforced).
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II. CHOICE OF LAW
Choosing the applicable substantive law is a question, like personal ju-
risdiction and judgment enforcement, involving both forum law and con-
stitutional issues. Understanding these issues requires a clear focus on
basic principles. First, choice of law is a question of state law, both in
state and federal courts.'1 Second, it is a question of forum state law.
Renvoi-the practice of using another state's choice-of-law rule-is al-
most never employed unless the forum state directs it, and, even then, the
forum state remains in control. 12 Third, the forum state has broad power
to make choice-of-law decisions, either legislatively or judicially, subject
only to limited constitutional requirements. a3
Within the forum state's control of choice of law is a hierarchy of
choice-of-law rules. At the top are legislative choice-of-law rules, that is,
statutes directing the application of certain states' laws, based on events
or people important to the operation of that specific law. 14 Second in the
choice-of-law hierarchy is party-controlled choice of law, that is, choice-
of-law clauses in contracts that control unless public policy dictates other-
wise. 15 Third in the hierarchy is the common law, now controlled in
Texas by the most significant relationship test of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Conflict of Laws. 16 This Survey article is organized according to
the hierarchy in statutory choice-of-law, followed by choice of law
clauses, and concluding with choice of law under the most significant rela-
tionship test. Special issues such as constitutional limitations are dis-
cussed in the following section. This grouping results in a discussion that
mixes Texas Supreme Court opinions with those of Texas intermediate
appellate courts, federal district courts, and the Fifth Circuit. In spite of
this mix, readers should of course note that because choice of law is a
state-law issue, the only binding opinions are those of the Texas Supreme
11. See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 497 (1941).
12. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) creates a presumption against renvoi except for lim-
ited circumstances. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICr OF LAWS § 8 (1988). Al-
though commentators defend renvoi's limited use, they acknowledge its general lack of
acceptance in the United States, except in limited circumstances where statutes direct its
use. See EUGENE F. SCOLES ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS 134-39 (3d 2000) [hereinafter
SCOLES]; WEINTRAUB, supra note 1 at 88-94. Texas law provides for renvoi in TEX. Bus. &
COM. CODE ANN. §§ 2.402(b) & 4.102(b) (Vernon 2005). For federal courts, Klaxon reiter-
ates the forum state's control of choice of law. 313 U.S. at 497.
13. See infra notes 81-91 and accompanying text for a brief description of these consti-
tutional requirements.
14. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 6(1), cmt. a (1971). See, e.g., Owens Corning v. Carter,
997 S.W.2d 560, 574 (Tex. 1999) (applying an earlier version of the Texas wrongful death
statute, requiring that the court "apply the rules of substantive law that are appropriate to
the case." TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.031 (Vernon Supp. 2005) (as amended
in 1997, with the same wording as this provision).
15. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 187 ("Law of the State Chosen by the Parties") allows
contracting parties to choose a governing law, within defined limits as explained infra notes
25-45 and accompanying text. Texas has adopted § 187. See DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp.,
793 S.W.2d 670, 677-78 (Tex. 1990).




A. STATUTORY CHOICE-OF-LAW RULES
The Survey period offered five cases involving choice-of-law statutes,
all from federal district courts, with the first three applying the Texas cod-
ification of the "internal affairs doctrine." Kira, Inc. v. All Star Mainte-
nance18 is instructive on several issues of choice-of-law advocacy, which
the federal district court found necessary in spite of the parties' agree-
ment, both in their contract and their less-than-adequate trial briefs, that
Nevada law governed. Kira was an action between LLC owners for sev-
eral claims arising from two owners' alleged misappropriation of funds
and misuse of the trade name. The parties had formed the company
under Nevada law to provide maintenance services at Fort Hood, Texas.
Two company members then used the company's name and money to
form a similar company in Delaware. 19 The operating agreement desig-
nated Nevada law, but the court, being precise, pointed out that Texas
had a statutory choice-of-law rule designating the law of the state of in-
corporation to determine the rights, powers, and duties of entity mem-
bers. This also leads to Nevada law, but the court asked for additional
briefs to clarify any conflicts between Nevada and Texas, both as to inter-
nal affairs and contractual claims that would be controlled by the parties'
choice-of-law clause. The parties' response failed to highlight specific
conflicts and alternatively cited Nevada and Texas cases, leading the court
to hold that Nevada law would govern, which it apparently determined
on judicial notice.20
The same statute controlled in Enigma Holdings, Inc. v. Gemplus Inter-
national S.A.,21 ruling that Luxembourg law governed the corporate gov-
ernance. claims in an action for fraud and corporate internal misdealing,22
and again in In re Dodgin,23 an Amarillo bankruptcy case where the court
ruled that the laws of the jurisdiction of incorporation of a foreign corpo-
ration govern the shareholders' liabilities for the corporation's debts,
leading to the application of New Mexico law.24
In Webber v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, the Fifth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals upheld the district court's application of Texas law to the prisoner's
17. The exception is when a federal court rules on a constitutional issue, such as legis-
lative jurisdiction or full faith and credit, or federal questions, such as foreign sovereign
immunity. See, e.g., Compaq Computer Corp. v. Lapray, 135 S.W.3d 657, 672-73 (Tex.
2004) (legislative jurisdiction) discussed infra note 71 and accompanying text; Mindis Met-
als, Inc. v. Oilfield Motor & Control, Inc., 132 S.W.3d 477, 484 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 2004, pet. denied) (full faith and credit).
18. No. A-03-CA-950LY, 2006 WL 2193006 (W.D. Tex. July 31, 2006).
19. Id. at *1-2.
20. Id. at *5-6, construing TEx. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN., art. 8.02 (Vernon 2003).
21. No. 3:05-CV-1168-B ECF, 2006 WL 2859369 (N.D. Tex. 2006).
22. Id. at *8.
23. No. 05-21729-RLJ-13, 2006 WL 3069714 (N.D. Tex. 2006).
24. Id. at *5.
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claims of malpractice against the prison.25 In Kimberly-Clark Corp. v.
Continental Casualty Co.,26 a Dallas federal court, conducting a forum
non-conveniens analysis, held that the Texas statute requiring that Texas
law govern certain locally insured interests did not apply because the
company, despite its primary location in Texas, was a Delaware
corporation. 27
B. CHOICE-OF-LAW CLAUSES IN CONTRACTS
Texas law and the Restatement (Second) permit contracting parties to
choose a governing law, 28 reflected in thirteen Survey-period cases. In a
case of first impression that will eventually be cited as one of the more
interesting conflicts cases, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals considered
dual choice-of-law clauses. International Interests, L.P. v. Hardy2 9 arises
simply enough from a Texas limited partnership's deficiency action
against an Oklahoma resident. Hardy, the Oklahoma resident, was a co-
owner of The Concierge of Houston, Inc., a Texas corporation in the
nursing-home business. In 2002, Concierge borrowed $4,820,000 from
Keybank in Ohio to buy a nursing home in Houston. The resulting prom-
issory note was secured by a deed of trust to the purchased property and,
in turn, personally guaranteed by Hardy. The deed of trust had an Ohio
choice-of-law clause and Hardy's personal guaranty designated Texas law,
but all were executed and delivered in Houston. When Concierge filed
for bankruptcy a few months later, Keybank sold Hardy's promissory
note to International Interests, which foreclosed on the nursing home and
then filed this action in a Houston federal court against Hardy for the
deficiency exceeding $3 million. Hardy count&rclaimed, attacking the
foreclosure sale as deficient. 30 The trial court granted summary judgment
to plaintiff International, based on Ohio law's lack of a deficiency offset.
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals identified the controlling
issues as the following: (1) under Texas choice-of-law rules, what law gov-
erns a deficiency action where the deed of trust and the personal guaranty
have competing choice-of-law clauses; and (2) although the right of defi-
ciency offset is waivable under Texas law, does a general choice-of-law
clause amount to a waiver? Because the Texas Supreme Court has ad-
dressed neither question, the Fifth Circuit certified the two questions for
the supreme court's response.31
25. Id. at *2 (citing to 29 U.S.C. § 1346(b)( 1), which grants jurisdiction to federal
district courts to hear claims for money damages against the United States, "if a private
person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the
act or omission occurred.").
26. No. 3:05-CV-0475-D, 2005 WL 2679698 (N.D. Tex. 2005).
27. Id. at *7 (construing TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.42 (Vernon 1981)).
28. See DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp., 793 S.W.2d 670, 677 (Tex. 1990); see also RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) § 187 (1971).
29. 448 F.3d 303, 304 (5th Cir. 2006).
30. Id. at 304B06.
31. Id. at 307-09.
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The Fifth Circuit also questioned whether Ohio law could properly be
applied to this case since, after Keybank's sale of the Hardy note, Ohio
lacked any further contact with the case.32 One additional Texas statute,
though the court did not mention it, might provide part of the answer to
this third question. Section 35.51(c) of the Texas Business and Commerce
Code provides that contracting parties may choose the law of a state hav-
ing no relation to them or the contract, subject to listed exceptions.33
One of those exceptions is a transaction which "transfers or creates an
interest in real property for security or otherwise. '34 Thus, Texas law
would not permit the parties here to choose an unrelated Ohio law to
govern any aspect of this transaction involving Hardy's guaranty on a real
property transaction. The question remains whether Ohio, which had a
relation to the original transaction through the Ohio-based lender, retains
that relation when the Ohio bank sells its interest.
Washington Mutual Bank v. Crest Mortgage Co.35 raises an interesting
dual choice-of-law issue involving the laws governing pre-judgment and
post-judgment interest. The parties had an agreement regarding the sale
of loans, with an arbitration clause and a choice of California law. Fol-
lowing a breach in 2004, Washington Mutual initiated an arbitration in
California. Crest defaulted, and the arbitrator awarded $9,704,075.17 to
Washington Mutual. Washington Mutual then sought confirmation and
enforcement in a Dallas federal court.36 In confirming the award, the
court ruled that pre-judgment interest was governed by the parties'
agreement and that their California choice was valid.37 Post-judgment
interest, however, was governed by federal law.38
Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. Harris39 concerns an employee's action to
recover on a consulting agreement. The parties' contract designated Illi-
nois law, which the trial court applied in granting summary judgment to
plaintiff. The court of appeals reversed and routinely applied Illinois law
to construe the contract as not requiring payment after plaintiff's volun-
tary resignation. 40 The analysis in Illinois Tool Works was sufficiently
straightforward that it would hardly merit mention here except for the
appellate court's footnote stating that, "In this opinion, when referring to
'courts,' or 'we,' we simply mean any court utilizing Illinois substantive
law."' 41 Although the Texas appellate court is entitled to cite to any opin-
ion applying pertinent Illinois law to construe this employment contract,
32. Id. at 308 n.9.
33. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE § 35.51(c) (Vernon 2002).
34. Id. § 35.51(f)( 1).
35. 418 F. Supp. 2d 860 (N.D. Tex. 2006).
36. Id. at 861.
37. Id. at 862.
38. Id. at 862-63. These holdings are well supported by precedent as cited by the
court. To the extent the disparity seems odd, the reason is that pre-judgment interest is a
matter of contract law, and is thus governed by the parties' agreement, while post-judg-
ment interest is a matter of forum (and thus federal) procedure.
39. 194 S.W.3d 529 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, no pet.).
40. Id. at 533-38.
41. Id. at 533 n.1.
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this footnote suggests that the court did not distinguish between control-
ling authority from the Illinois Supreme Court and mere persuasive au-
thority from other courts applying Illinois law.
Choice-of-law clauses may also be dispositive on the validity of arbitra-
tion agreements, as illustrated by four Survey period opinions. Two Texas
courts of appeals affirmed the parties' choice of federal arbitration law
over the Texas Arbitration Act or other arbitration law,42 contrasted with
two appellate opinions holding that a choice-of-law clause can render ar-
bitration agreements unenforceable.4 3 Similarly, a federal district court
upheld an arbitration clause governed by Connecticut law.4 4 In other
cases, a Houston court of appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling that a
promissory note's designation of Oregon law governed a Texas corpora-
tion's usury claim, in spite of the Oregon-based note's incorporation of an
earlier promissory note designating Texas law;45 and Texas federal courts
enforced choice-of-law clauses choosing (1) Pennsylvania law to interpret
plaintiff's claim that FedEx wrongly reconfigured his delivery route,
which was apparently in Texas;4 6 (2) Illinois law to govern indemnity
agreements on construction performance bonds issued in Texas to a Texas
company and Texas residents but issued by Illinois residents;47 and (3)
Texas law to govern an arbitration enforcement, where the choice of law
determined in turn whether plaintiff had standing to enforce the award
against five Mexican companies and a Cayman Island corporation.48
Only one Survey-period opinion rejected a choice-of-law clause, and
on the most basic of premises. The Austin Court of Appeals held a
choice-of-law clause inapplicable to the plaintiff's tort claims, but then
made a cursory conclusion backing any factual analysis that Texas law
would govern the tort claims under the most significant relationship
test.
4 9
42. In re Raymond James & Assocs., Inc., 196 S.W.3d 311, 321 (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.); In re Jim Walter Homes, Inc., 207 S.W.3d 888, 896 (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, no pet. h.).
43. In re Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., 202 S.W.3d 477, 480-81 (Tex. App.-Dallas
2006, no pet.) (parties' contract provided that New York law governed, thus negating appli-
cation of the Texas Arbitration Act); West Tex. Positron, Ltd. v. Cahill, No. 07-05-0297-CV
2005 WL 3526483, at *2 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2005, no pet.) (parties' choice of Texas law
pointed to Texas interpretation of waiver).
44. Bagley v. Allied Domecq Spirits & Wine USA, Inc., No. 3:06-CV-0617-6, 2006 WL
2035660 at *2 (N.D. Tex. 2006).
45. Saturn Capital Corp., H.F. v. Dorsey, No. 01-04-00626-CV, 2006 WL 1767602, at
*9 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. denied).
46. Montoya v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., No. Civ.A.5:04-CV-00101, 2006 WL
133455 at *3 (S.D. Tex. 2006), applying RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187
(1971).
47. Am. Motorist Ins. Co. v. Southcrest Constr., Inc., No. Civ. A. 3:04-CV-2575M,
2006 WL 995202, at *3 (N.D. Tex. 2006).
48. Int'l Transactions, Ltd. v. Embotelladora Agral Regiomontana S.A. de C.V., No.
3:01-CV-1140-G ECF, 2006 WL 2217478, at *34 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 3, 2006)
49. Parker Barber & Beauty Supply, Inc. v. The Wella Corp., 2006 WL 2918571 at *11
(Tex. App.-Austin 2006, no pet. h.) (citing Stier v. Reading & Bates Corp., 992 S.W.2d
423, 433 (Tex. 1999)).
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C. THE MOST SIGNIFICANT RELATIONSHIP TEST
In the absence of a statutory choice-of-law rule or an effective choice-
of-law clause, Texas courts apply the most significant relationship test
from the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws.50 The Survey period
produced fifteen cases applying the test.
1. Contract Cases
In Sunshine Traders of El Paso, Inc. v. Dolgencorp, Inc.,51 the United
States District Court for the Western District of Texas committed what
appears to be an error in analyzing the defendant's choice-of-law argu-
ment. Dolgencorp, a Kentucky corporation with its principal place of
business in Tennessee, ordered men's jeans from the plaintiff, an El Paso
company. The agreement designated Kentucky law as controlling. The
district court first noted correctly that "[d]istrict courts sitting in diversity
apply the choice-of-law rules of the forum state,"52 and that "[i]n Texas,
contractual choice-of-law provisions are typically enforced. '53 But be-
cause plaintiff had not signed the purchase orders containing the choice-
of-law clause, the court found the choice-of-law clause inapplicable-an-
other sound holding. But then the court noted the longstanding rule of
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins54 that "a federal court must apply state
law to cases not governed by federal law," and used this to conclude that
"the Court is of the opinion that Erie binds the Court to apply Texas law
to this dispute. '55 Erie does nothing of the sort. Rather, Erie dictates
that in cases governed by state law, the appropriate state law is the one in
which the federal court sits, and that this includes the local state's choice-
of-law rule.5 6 In this case, the court had already said as much. It even
took the first correct steps by applying Texas law regarding contractual
choice-of-law clauses, even though the court inappropriately cited a
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals precedent for its conclusion when the
appropriate citation would have to be from a Texas court.57 But having
held the unsigned choice-of-law provision inapplicable, the next step is to
50. In applying the most significant relationship test, seven factors are to be balanced
according to the needs of the particular case. They are: (a) the needs of the interstate and
international systems, (b) the relevant policies of the forum, (c) the relevant policies of
other interested states, and the relative interests of those states in the determination of the
particular issue, (d) the protection of justified expectations, (e) the basic policies underly-
ing the particular field of law, (f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and (g)
ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied. RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(2). This listing is not by priority, which varies from case to
case. Id. at cmt. c. In a larger sense, the most significant relationship test includes the
other choice-of-law sections throughout the Restatement (Second).
51. No. EP-02-CA-438-DB, 2006 WL 1472467 (W.D. Tex. May 24, 2006).
52. Id. at *2 (citing Smith v. EMC Corp., 393 F.3d 590, 597 (5th Cir. 2004)).
53. Id.
54. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
55. Id. (referring to Erie, 304 U.S. at 64).
56. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78-80 (1938).
57. 2006 WL 1472467, at *2 (citing United Int'l Holdings, Inc. v. Wharf (Holdings)
Ltd., 210 F.3d 1207, 1223 (10th Cir. 2000)).
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continue following Texas choice-of-law rules to choose the governing sub-
stantive law. That would no doubt involve the application of the most
significant relationship test, not an Erie-induced application of Texas law.
In other contract cases, Texas courts of appeals held that (1) Texas law
governed alleged fraudulent misrepresentations made in Pennsylvania
but received and relied upon in Texas, thus negating plaintiffs' claims;58
and (2) Louisiana law, unsurprisingly, governed indemnification for oil
field deaths in Louisiana.59 Federal district courts in Texas held that (1)
Texas law governed Kimberly-Clark's insurance claim for losses arising
from the purchase of invalid tax credits by three of its Brazilian subsidiar-
ies;60 (2) Illinois law governed, over plaintiff's un-analyzed objection, a
claim for breach of contract and wrongful disposal of salvage material
located in Illinois, where the contract was made and to be performed in
Illinois; 6' and (3) Nebraska law governed plaintiff's claim against his in-
surance company for a car accident in Mexico. 62 As discussed further
below, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals certified a case to the Texas
Supreme Court for clarification of Texas law regarding the parties' right
to choose the law of a state unrelated to the contract. 63
2. Tort Cases
In Cates v. Creamer,64 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals rendered a
significant decision regarding a car rental company's liability. In 1998,
Matthew and Lamae Creamer rented a minivan from Hertz in Florida,
with an agreement allowing them to drive anywhere in the United States
or Canada but requiring them to return the minivan to Florida. The
Creamers drove through the night toward Texas, where they were headed
for a family reunion. Near daybreak, Mr. Creamer fell asleep while driv-
ing and hit plaintiff Cates's car, with Cates standing beside it. Cates is
now incapacitated and lives in a long-term care facility. His guardian
sued the Creamers for negligence and sued Hertz under Florida's "dan-
gerous instrumentality doctrine," which imposes vicarious liability on the
owner-lessor of a vehicle for a bailee's negligence. The federal district
court in Dallas rejected the application of Florida law and dismissed the
action against Hertz because it had no liability under Texas law. In the
subsequent trial, the jury found Creamer not to be negligent, but the trial
58. Prospect High Income Fund, ML CBO IV (Cayman), Ltd. v. Grant Thornton,
LLP, 203 S.W.3d 602, 610 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2006, pet. filed).
59. Cudd Pressure Control, Inc. v. Sonat Exploration Co., 202 S.W.3d 901, 910-11
(Tex. App.-Texarkana 2006, no pet.), discussed infra at notes 131-33 and accompanying
text.
60. Kimberly-Clark, 2005 WL 2679698 at *7, discussed supra at note 24 and accompa-
nying text.
61. Comex Int'l v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., No. Civ.A.4-04-3637, 2006 WL 355230 at *5
(S.D. Tex. 2006).
62. Guillen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. B-05-292, 2006 WL 1295060 at *3
(S.D. Tex. 2006).
63. Int'l Interests, L.P. v. Hardy, 448 F.3d 303, 309 (5th Cir. 2006).
64. 431 F.3d 456 (5th Cir. 2005).
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court granted a motion for new trial, which Cates won. Creamer ap-
pealed the verdict, and Cates appealed Hertz's dismissal. 65 On the appli-
cability of Florida law, the Fifth Circuit applied Restatement (Second)
section 174 regarding vicarious liability and found that, contrary to the
trial court's dismissal, Florida law governed. 66 This issue-applying the
rental state's law to vicarious liability in other states and thus benefiting
nonresident third parties having no relation to the rental company-has
caught the eye of conflicts scholars for the past few years.67 With Cates,
the Fifth Circuit has added to the case law discussion with a precise and
well-reasoned opinion. An equally well-reasoned dissent argued not for
Texas law but for the federal appellate court to certify this important
question to the Texas Supreme Court for a clearer direction on Texas
choice of law regarding interstate vicarious liability.68
Greenwell v. Davis69 involves interstate claims of government immu-
nity and presents another fact pattern from this Survey period that has
caught national attention in the past few years. Greenwell, an on-duty
police officer in Texarkana, Arkansas, collided with Davis's car on the
Texas side of State Line Avenue in Texarkana. When Davis sued Green-
well and Texarkana, Arkansas, in a Texas state court, defendants claimed
immunity under Arkansas law. Arkansas waives immunity only to the ex-
tent the liability is insured, limiting liability here to $20,000. Texas, on the
other hand, limits liability to $250,000 for each claimant and $500,000 for
each occurrence. The trial court held that Texas law governed, but the
Texarkana Court of Appeals reversed on a finding that, while the Consti-
tution's Full Faith and Credit Clause did not mandate the application of
Arkansas law, 70 non-binding comity should be extended to Arkansas and
did not violate Texas public policy.71
In other cases, federal district courts (1) applied the general tort sec-
tions of the Restatement (Second) to hold that Texas law governed the
nonfederal claims in a copyright infringement and tortious interference
action by a California company against a California defendant and its
former employees for alleged infringements in Texas; 72 (2) applied the
workers' compensation section of the Restatement (Second) to hold that
Louisiana law governed a Texas employer's claim of immunity for injury
to its worker in Louisiana but further found that the employer had no
immunity under Louisiana law and that Texas law consequently governed
65. Id. at 458-60.
66. Id. at 462-66.
67. See Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice-of-law in the American Courts in 2005: Nine-
teenth Annual Survey, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 559 (2005); see also id. at 560 n.1.
68. Cates, 431 F.3d at 466-69.
69. 180 S.W.3d 287 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2005, pet. denied) (citing, inter alia, Ne-
vada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 421 (1979) and Franchise Tax Bd. v. Hyatt, 538 U.S. 488, 499
(2003)).
70. 180 S.W.3d at 295-96.
71. Id. at 292, 296-99.
72. MGE UPS Sys., Inc. v. Fakouri Elec. Eng'g, Inc., 422 F. Supp. 2d 724, 739-40 (N.D.
Tex. 2006) (applying RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145(2) (1971)).
[Vol. 60
Conflict of Laws
the award; 73 (3) denied two international forum non-conveniens motions
based in part on the choice-of-law analysis;74 and (4) did a cursory choice-
of-law analysis to determine whether various tort claims fell under the
parties' arbitration agreement. 75
3. Class Action Certifications
Class actions certified under the common-question-predominates stan-
dard of Texas and federal law require a showing that a common question
of law or fact predominates over disparate issues in the case.76 Trial court
certifications of multi-state or nationwide classes that fail to make a re-
cord on this issue are now routinely reversed, as illustrated by two cases
during this Survey period. The most significant opinion comes from an El
Paso federal district court that denied class certification in an action for
personal injuries resulting from x-ray emissions. In Norwood v. Raytheon
Co.,7 7 the proposed class included all "radar technicians, operators, and/
or mechanics who have suffered and/or are suffering certain illnesses, in-
juries and/or death as a direct and proximate result of exposure" to cer-
tain radar equipment, along with other persons with independent or
derivative claims arising from their relationship with class members.78
Defendants included several designers, manufacturers, and marketers of
radar devices. The court found the class-including five subclasses-ade-
quately defined79 but inadequate on the commonality and typicality re-
quirements. Class members lived in all fifty states and several foreign
countries, and the claims would require a choice-of-law analysis particu-
lar to each individual's claims within each subclass. 80 This would entail
not only the application of fifty states' laws but also those of various for-
eign countries, and the court accordingly held that class litigation was not
superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication
of the controversy. 81
73. XL Specialty Ins. Co. v. Kiewet Offshore Servs., Ltd., 426 F. Supp. 2d (S.D. Tex.
2006) (citing Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws § 184 (1971)).
74. Bund Zur Unterstutzung Radargeschadigter E.V. v. Raytheon Co., No. 5:04CV73,
2006 WL 3197645 at *11 (W.D. Tex. 2006) (the fact that both German and American law
would apply in the same case was not grounds for forum-non-conveniens dismissal in a
claim by sixteen American and German plaintiffs for radiation exposure from defendant's
products); Sacks v. Four Seasons Hotel, Ltd., No. 5:04CV73, 2006 WL 783441, at *12-20
(E.D. Tex. 2006) (Texas had the most significant relationship to this wrongful-death claim
by a Texas family for a death in Mexico).
75. Frindar Megasoft Int'l, Inc. v. Telcordia Techs., Inc., No. A-06-CA-600LY, 2006
WL 3063434 at *2 (W.D. Tex. 2006).
76. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)( 3); TEX. R. Civ. P. 42(b)( 3) (Vernon Supp. 2006). See
also Compaq Computer Corp. v. Lapray, 135 S.W.3d 657, 672-73 (Tex. 2004) (clarifying the
need for an appropriate choice-of-law analysis in certifying multi-state class actions).
Lapray is discussed at George & Teller, Annual Survey of Conflicts, 58 SMU L. REV. 679,
706-07 (2005).
77. 237 F.R.D. 581 (W.D. Tex. 2006).
78. Id. at 584-85
79. Id. at 586.
80. Id. at 596.
81. Id. at 604-05 (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)( 3)).
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In All American Life & Casualty Insurance Co. v. Vandeventer,8 2 the
Fort Worth Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the trial court's cer-
tification of a class regarding claims by insured parties for breach of con-
tract, illusory contract, and good faith and fair dealing breach, relating to
the defendant's sale of policies to a Texas insurer, American Insurance
Company of Texas, who then cancelled them.83 The class numbered ap-
proximately five hundred and, according to an earlier appeal in the same
case, purchased the policies while residing in Indiana and South Caro-
lina.84 In an earlier stage of the dispute, the trial court had agreed with
defendant All American that class certification was inappropriate. The
court of appeals reversed and remanded for reconsideration of the class
formation, based in part on All American's failure to demonstrate any
true conflict between the applicable states' laws.8 5 On remand, the trial
court ordered class certification, but, in the meantime, the Texas Supreme
Court had decided Lapray, requiring the trial court to analyze choice-of-
law when forming a multi-state class action. 86 This shifted the burden to
plaintiffs to demonstrate the lack of any conflicts, and because the trial
court had not conducted any choice of law analysis, the court of appeals
reversed class certification and remanded for that analysis. 87
D. OTHER CHOICE-OF-LAW ISSUES
1. Legislative Jurisdiction and Other Constitutional Limits on State
Choice-of-law Rules
Similar to the due-process limitation on state long-arm statutes, 88 the
United States Constitution imposes limits on a state's ability to choose
the governing law in its courts. Unlike the limits on state long-arm stat-
utes (which arise only under the due process clause), the choice-of-law
limits arise under several doctrines-due process (requiring a reasonable
connection between the dispute and the governing law), full faith and
credit (requiring the choice-of-law analysis to consider the interests of
other affected states), and, to a lesser extent, equal protection, privileges
and immunities, the commerce clause, and the contract clause. 8 9 Consti-
tutional problems most often occur when a state court chooses its own
law in questionable circumstances. But the inappropriate choice of forum
82. No. 0205-016-CV, 2006 WL 742452 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2006, no pet.).
83. Id. at *5.
84. See Vandeventer v. All Am. Life & Cas. Co., 101 S.W.3d 703, 707 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 2003, no pet.), discussed at James P. George & Anna Teller, Conflict of Laws, 57
SMU L. REV. 719, 749-50 (2004).
85. 101 S.W.3d at 711-712, 724.
86. See supra note 71.
87. 2006 WL 742452, at *3-5.
88. See supra notes 30-36.
89. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 9 and comments; see also SCOLES, supra note 12 at
145-76; WEINTRAUB, supra note 1 at 585-648; James P. George, Choice-of-law: A Guide for
Texas Attorneys, 25 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 833, 844-46 (1994). Choice-of-law limits under full




law is not the only conceivable constitutional issue, and even when choos-
ing foreign law, courts must apply choice-of-law rules with an eye toward
constitutional limitations. 90
Two Survey-period cases addressed fact settings that could have raised
this due-process issue, but instead resolved the conflicts question on non
constitutional grounds. In International Interests, L.P. v. Hardy,91 dis-
cussed above, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals certified two questions
to the Texas Supreme Court regarding competing choice-of-law clauses
and their application to the debtor's right to a deficiency offset in a Texas
foreclosure sale. The Fifth Circuit also raised the point that Ohio law,
designated in the debtor's personal guaranty, lost any connection to the
transaction and resulting litigation when the Ohio bank sold its interests
to the foreclosing plaintiff. Specifically, the Fifth Circuit raised this ques-
tion under Texas case law that parties to a contract "cannot require that
their contract be governed by the law of a jurisdiction which has no rela-
tion whatever to them or their agreement. '92 Although the Fifth Circuit
referred only to Texas case law and the Restatement (Second) of Conflict
of Laws, the requirement that a state apply only laws having a reasonable
relation to the parties and the dispute is one of due process.93 But this
due-process limit has been applied only outside the setting of parties who
have agreed to a choice of law.94 That is, United States Supreme Court
case law has never ruled for or against the application of the due process
clause to contracts with choice-of-law clauses. The obvious reason is that
if the forum state permits contracting parties to choose an unrelated law
(as many states do, on limited grounds),95 and if the choice-of-law clause
at issue is contractually valid, and if the legal result does not contravene
forum public policy,96 then there is little opportunity for surprise or un-
fairness. As far as can be determined, this issue has not come up before.
It does here, however, because the Fifth Circuit noted that Ohio lost its
connection when the Ohio lender sold its interest to a non-Ohio party.
Even with Ohio losing its connection to the dispute, it remains true that
Hardy cannot be unfairly surprised by the application of Ohio law since
90. See Compaq Computer Corp. v. Lapray, 135 S.W.3d 657,672 (Tex. 2004), discussed
at James P. George & Anna K. Teller, Conflict of Laws, 58 SMU L. REV. 679, 706-07(2005).
91. 448 F.3d at 309, discussed supra note 58 and accompanying text.
92. Id. at 308 (quoting DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp., 793 S.W.2d 670, 677 (Tex. 1990)
and citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2) and cmt. d).
93. See Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 407-08 (1930), Phillips Petroleum v.
Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 806-07 (1985), and other cases listed in the sources cited supra note
82.
94. Compare the cases discussed at Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws ' 9 cmt.
c and Reporters Note (discussing the constitutionally decided choice-of-law cases) with
those at Restatement (Second) § 187 cmt. f and Reporter's Note to Comment f (discussing
case law regarding contractual choice-of-law clauses).
95. See, e.g., TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE § 35.51(c) (Vernon 2002); see also SCOLES,
supra note 12, at 876-77.
96. See, e.g., TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE § 35.51. See also SCOLES, supra note 12 at 876.
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he agreed to it earlier in writing. But it does raise an interesting constitu-
tional issue, although the court did not apply that label.
2. Comity Recognizing Neighboring State's Sovereign Immunity
In Greenwell v. Davis,97 the Texarkana Court of Appeals reversed a
trial court's rejection of Arkansas's sovereign immunity for an automo-
bile accident in Texas. 98 State Line Avenue straddles the Arkansas-Texas
border in Texarkana, with the northbound lanes on the Arkansas side and
the southbound lanes in Texas. Greenwell is a police officer in Texar-
kana, Arkansas, and he collided with Davis on the Texas side of State
Line Avenue. She sued in a Texas court, which rejected Greenwell's in-
vocation of the Arkansas immunity statute limiting defendants' liability
to $20,000. Texas law, assuming its tort claims act could be applied to
Arkansas, would allow Davis to claim $250,000. 99 On interlocutory ap-
peal, the court of appeals agreed with defendants and ruled that, while
full faith and credit did not compel the Texas court to recognize the Ar-
kansas immunity statute, comity required deference to the neighboring
sovereign. 100
3. False Conflicts
A false conflict exists when other potentially applicable laws are the
same as the forum's laws or at least reach the same result.10 1 Defining a
clear, outcome-changing difference between the forum's laws and the for-
eign law is the first step in conducting a choice-of-law analysis, and the
absence of a clear conflict should result in the application of forum
law. 10 2 The fact that the laws do not conflict may compel a conclusion
that the cases are not worth reporting, but that is a hasty conclusion in
some cases. Why the court determined the conflict to be false, or the
setting in which the laws appeared identical, or the necessary degree of
similarity, are all issues that may prove valuable to readers contemplating
a choice-of-law argument. Moreover, while some false conflicts analyses
may be cursory, some are complex.' 0 3 The Survey period produced
97. 180 S.W.3d 287 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2005, pet. denied).
98. Id. at 291-99.
99. Id. at 290-92.
100. Id. at 295-98.
101. This is the Restatement's definition of false conflict. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
§ 145, cmt. i; id. § 186 cmt. c. A very different concept of false conflicts came from Profes-
sor Brainerd Currie's government interest analysis, which defines a false conflict as one in
which only one state has a real interest. See SCOLES, supra note 12 at 29-30. Unfortunately,
Texas courts have used both definitions. See James P. George, False Conflicts and Faulty
Analysis: Judicial Misuse of Governmental Interests in the Second Restatement of Conflict of
Laws, 23 REV. LITIG. 489, 493-98 (2004).
102. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 837-45 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
103. In the 2004 Survey period, a case involving arguments for the application of five
states' laws ended up with a false conflict. See Senior Living Props. L.L.C. Trust 309 B.R.
223, 233 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2004), reported at George & Teller, Conflict of Laws, 59 SMU
L. REV. 1039, 1069 (2006).
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twelve false-conflict cases. Railroad Management Co., L. L. C. v. CFS Lou-
isiana Midstream Co.10 4 involved the right to license payments from a
pipeline owner who had obtained rights from a railroad company. A se-
ries of assignments on both sides led to plaintiffs owing the license and
CFS having the obligation. The federal district court in Houston granted
summary judgment for CFS, and plaintiffs appealed, arguing among other
points that the trial court should have applied Louisiana law. But plain-
tiffs' failure to "indicate any salient difference" between Louisiana and
Texas law led to the Fifth Circuit's quick rejection of this argument. The
appellate court went on to find that plaintiffs failed to prove an enforcea-
ble contract, which fell under the same standard under both Louisiana
and Texas laws. 10 5
The same rule applied in Lennar Corp. v. Great American Insurance
Co.,106 a homebuilder's action against several insurance carriers for in-
demnity on buyers' claims for defective exterior insulation on homes built
in the Houston area. The trial court granted summary judgment to the
insurers on the grounds that these losses were not covered under the poli-
cies. On appeal, one of the defendant insurers-American Dynasty Sur-
plus Lines-argued that Florida law governed the all-important coverage
issue. The opinion does not indicate why Florida law might be applied to
insurance coverage on homes built in Houston. There is no report of a
Florida connection, although a choice-of-law clause in the insurance
agreement is likely. In any event, the Florida connection was moot be-
cause American Dynasty failed in its burden to demonstrate a conflict
between Texas and Florida law.10 7
Berg v. Sage Environmental Consulting of Austin, Inc.10 8 is a study in
careful choice-of-law analysis that will avoid appellate reversal. This was
an employment claim, with Berg suing Sage in a Louisiana federal court
for breaches of his compensation package as a manager in Louisiana.
Sage filed an inconvenient-forum objection and won a transfer to the
Northern District of Texas, thus requiring the Dallas federal court to ap-
ply Louisiana's choice-of-law rule. 10 9 The district court carefully applied
Louisiana's comparative impairment analysis, determined that the Louisi-
ana choice-of-law rule pointed to Louisiana law, and held that Louisiana
law did not differ from Texas law." 0 Further insulating against error, the
district court rejected Sage's argument that the false conflict dictated that
Texas law apply. Instead, the court held that false conflicts require that
forum law be applied, and that forum was Louisiana."' In the event a
104. 428 F.3d 214 (5th Cir. 2005).
105. Id. at 222.
106. 200 S.W.3d 651 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. filed).
107. Id. at 676-77.
108. No. 3:05-CV-1215-G, 2006 WL 2381593 (N.D. Tex. 2006).
109. Id.; 2006 WL 2381593 at *2-3 (citing Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964)
construing 28 U.S.C.A. § 1404 as requiring transferee courts to apply the choice-of-law rule
of the transferor forum).
110. Berg, 2006 WL 2381593, at *3.
111. Id. at *24.
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conflict materialized, the court would have correctly applied the law cho-
sen by the Louisiana choice-of-law rule.
Other false conflicts during the Survey period included legal malprac-
tice in an automobile accident in Pennsylvania; 112 in-an action to collect
lease payments for equipment used in Nevada;11 3 in an insurance claim
for business interruption in Arkansas for a policy brokered in Texas by an
Indiana insurer;1 1 4 in antitrust and breach of contract claims regarding
the broadcasting of Judge Judy and Judge Joe Brown television programs
in the Houston area, where the contract designated California law;'1 5 in a
debt claim based on an oral contract arising in Pennsylvania;' 16 and in a
fraudulent transfer claim relating to loans partly based in Mexico, with
the loan agreement designating Arizona law.
1 17
The cases above are the first kind of false conflicts, where the court
believes the different states' laws are the same. The second false-conflict
category is where the laws differ but reach the same result. These are
sometimes not identified as false conflicts but just as the cases with identi-
cal laws; the same-result false conflicts do not require the court to deter-
mine which law governs, although it might require the court to analyze
the outcome under both (or all) potentially applicable laws. Three exam-
ples occurred during the Survey period. In Motiva Enterprises, LLC v.
Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 118 the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Texas held that the LLC operating agreement's in-
demnity clause was not enforceable either under Delaware law (the
plaintiff entity's formation state) or Texas law (situs of some of the in-
sured interests), in spite of distinctly different approaches in the two
states.11 9 The district court held that plaintiff's theory of successor liabil-
ity for wrongful discharge failed both under New York and Texas law,
with the laws not being identical. 120 John v. Key Energy Services, Inc.1 21
employs the same approach in holding that, even though Pennsylvania
law varies from Texas law on the award of attorney fees in declaratory
judgment actions, the fees in this case were not recoverable under either
states' laws. 122 These cases are also examples of the error-avoidance ap-
112. Fogarty v. USA Truck, Inc., No. Civ.A.3:05-CV-1783-M, 2006 WL 42364 at *3
(N.D. Tex. 2006).
113. Fin. Fed. Credit, Inc. v. Dinardo, 2006 WL 734391 at *3 (S.D. Tex. 2006).
114. Allianz Cornhill Int'l v. Great Lakes Chem. Corp., No. Civ.A.H-04-1668, 2006 WL
778618 at *3 (S.D. Tex. 2006).
115. Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Johnson Broad. Co., No. Civ.A.H.04-03488, 2006 WL
367874 at *5 (S.D. Tex. 2006).
116. Bocchi Ams. Assocs., Inc. v. Commerce Fresh Mktg., Inc., No. H-04-02411, 2006
WL 2882721 at *6 (S.D. Tex. 2006).
117. Smith v. Am. Founders Fin. Corp., No. H-05-1779, 2006 WL 2844251 at *7 (S.D.
Tex. 2006).
118. No. H-05-1473, 2006 WL 3246039 (S.D. Tex. 2006).
119. Id. at *4-6.
120. 2006 WL 2842008 at *9-10 (N.D. Tex. 2006).
121. 2006 WL 2266262 (S.D. Tex. 2006).
122. Id. at *8-9. The court also held that neither Pennsylvania law nor Texas law ap-
plied because the issue was controlled by federal law. Id.
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proach in the Berg case, discussed above. 123
4. Proof of Foreign Law
Litigants seeking the application of other state or national laws must
comply with the forum's rules for pleading and proving foreign law. In
both Texas and federal courts, judicial notice is sufficient for the applica-
tion of sister states' laws. 124 Foreign law, on the other hand, must be
adequately pleaded and proven.125 Lee v. M/V Gem of Madras 26 is a
claim by a Hong Kong based oil company for fuel delivered in Korea to a
ship, the Gem of Madras, registered in India. After defendant ignored
plaintiff's $233,550 invoice for 1,125 metric tons of fuel, plaintiff had the
ship seized in Houston and then filed an admiralty claim for breach of
contract. Admiralty claims filed in the United States are governed by
federal law, which includes a choice-of-law rule based on federal common
law requiring the court to consider the place of the wrongful act, the law
of the ship's flag, the parties' allegiance or domicile, the place of con-
tracting, the inaccessibility of a foreign forum, and the law of the fo-
rum.127 The court was puzzled why neither party demonstrated the
applicability of United States admiralty law to an event having nothing to
do with the United States other than the site of seizure but nonetheless
applied local law because of the parties' failure to object or plead any-
thing else.' 28
Dalglish v. Royal Indemnity Co. 129 illustrates the use of choice of law in
a personal-jurisdiction analysis. Royal is a credit insurer seeking recovery
for alleged fraud in tuition loans. In particular, Royal sought recovery
from two Pennsylvania residents who operated a Delaware corporation,
123. See supra notes 102-04 and accompanying text.
124. TEX. R. EVID. 202 allows a Texas court to take judicial notice of sister states' laws
on its own motion and requires it to do so upon a party's motion. Parties must supply
"sufficient information" for the court to comply. Id. Federal practice is the same under
federal common law; neither the Federal Rules of Evidence nor the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure address judicial notice of American states' laws. See Lamar v. Micou, 114 U.S.
218, 223 (1885); Kucel v. Walter E. Heller & Co., 813 F.2d 67, 74 (5th Cir. 1987). Even
though FED. R. EVID. 201 (the sole federal evidence rule dealing with judicial notice) does
not apply to states' laws, we should assume that Lamar's judicial notice mandate for Amer-
ican states' laws is subject to FED. R. EVID. 201(b)'s provision for proof of matters "capa-
ble of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot
reasonably be questioned." That is, federal courts may take judicial notice of American
states' laws from (1) official statutory and case reports, (2) widely used unofficial versions,
or (3) copies, all subject to evidentiary rules on authentication and best evidence.
125. TEX. R. EVID. 203 requires written notice of foreign law by pleading or other rea-
sonable notice at least thirty days before trial, including all written materials or sources
offered as proof. For non-English originals, parties must provide copies of both the origi-
nal and the English translation. Sources include affidavits, testimony, briefs, treatises, and
any other material source, whether or not submitted by a party, and whether or not other-
wise admissible under the Texas Rules of Evidence. Federal practice is similar. See FED.
R. Cv. P. 44.1.
126. No. Civ.A. H-05-0631, 2006 WL 568545 at *1 (S.D. Tex. 2006).
127. Id. at *2 (citing Lauritzen v. Larson, 345 U.S. 571 (1953) and other cases).
128. Id. at *4.
129. No. 09-06-069CV, 2006 WL 3334543 (Tex. App.C Beaumont 2006, no pet. h.).
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also a defendant. The trial court applied Delaware law to govern the
issue of veil piercing on which Royal based its argument for Texas having
personal jurisdiction over the two people who allegedly committed the
fraud in the defendant company's name. The court of appeals affirmed,
found no evident conflict between Delaware and Texas law, and applied
the presumption that Delaware was the same as Texas law.
130
5. Use of the Forum's Procedural Rules
Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. Harris,31 an employee's action to recover
on a consulting agreement, is discussed elsewhere in this Survey but
briefly raises a procedural distinction. The parties' employment agree-
ment called for Illinois law, but the court of appeals noted at the outset
that, while the choice-of-law clause required the court to apply Illinois
law in construing the contract, this choice would not control the issue of
the deference the appellate court gave the trial court's construction of
that contract. The rule, as the court noted, is that "the forum will apply
[its] own law to matters of remedy and procedure. '1 32
6. Indemnitor's Intervention on Appeal to Raise Choice-of-law Issue
Omitted by Insured
The Texas Supreme Court produced only one choice-of-law discussion
during the Survey period, an opinion that did not apply choice-of-law
principles but instead demonstrated the importance of the choice-of-law
question. In re Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co.1 33 concerned insurance
claims arising from a 1998 well explosion in Louisiana that killed seven
people and severely injured others. Well owner Sonat Exploration had
entered a Master Service Agreement for snubbing operations with Cudd
Pressure Control Inc., and both were sued. Sonat and Cudd had agreed
to indemnify each other, and according to Sonat's interpretation, Lum-
bermens was required to provide insurance. Lumbermens was Cudd's ex-
cess insurer at the time. When claimants sued Sonat and Cudd in Texas,
Sonat cross-claimed against Cudd for indemnity and separately sued
Cudd and Lumbermens for breach of contract. Sonat settled the wrong-
ful-death and injury claims, leaving only the indemnity claims against
Cudd and Lumbermens. A potentially dispositive issue was whether
Louisiana or Texas law governed the Sonat/Cudd agreement-according
to the parties' arguments, Louisiana law voided the indemnity provision
while Texas law upheld it. The trial court ruled that Texas law applied,
and, in the resulting jury trial, Sonat won a $20.7 million verdict. 13 4 Al-
though Lumbermens was a party in related lawsuits, it was not a party to
130. Id. at *1, *4.
131. 194 S.W.3d 529 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, no pet.), discussed supra at
notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
132. Id. at 532.
133. 184 S.W.3d 718 (Tex. 2006).
134. Id. at 720-22.
[Vol. 60
Conflict of Laws
this action at the point it entered appellate status. Lumbermens nonethe-
less posted a $29 million security bond for Cudd's appeal. When Cudd
failed to raise the all-important choice-of-law issue on appeal, Lumber-
mens intervened. 35 The court of appeals denied Lumbermens' interven-
tion and Lumbermens brought a mandamus action in the Texas Supreme
Court.1 36 In what appears to be a ruling of first impression-whether an
indemnitor may intervene on appeal to raise a dispositive issue-the su-
preme court found in Lumbermens= favor and remanded to the court of
appeals for review of the choice-of-law decision. 137
On remand, the Texarkana Court of Appeals entered an equally com-
pelling choice-of-law opinion. 138 It first found that the parties' Master
Service agreement was intended to be used for well operation in several
states, and though there was no choice-of-law designation for any one
state, the contract clearly indicated a wish that the law of the state where
the wells were located would govern a particular dispute.1 3 9 The court
then found this to be an inadequate contractual choice-of-law and, in the
absence of a clear choice by the parties, the court performed a thorough
most significant relationship analysis, concluding that Louisiana law
applied. 140
7. Choice of law and In Rem Jurisdiction
In rem cases do not ordinarily raise conflict-of-laws issues. The general
rule is that the first court asserting valid in rem jurisdiction over the prop-
erty has exclusive control to the exclusion of other courts.' 4 ' In United
States v. Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development,14 2 this rule
led to the unusual instance of the procedural laws of other jurisdictions
having application here. Holy Land Foundation is a Texas based non-
profit organization that raises money for causes in the Middle East. The
United States government prosecuted the Foundation for supporting ter-
rorist organizations, and, as part of that prosecution, sued for forfeiture
of the Foundation's assets. Apart from the government's action against
the Foundation, victims of attacks in Israel sued the Foundation in federal
court in Rhode Island seeking civil damages. After obtaining a default
judgment for $116,409,123, plaintiffs pursued collection in three states-
New York, South Carolina, and Washington-where the Foundation had
135. Id. at 721-22.
136. Id. at 722.
137. Id. at 722-29. The ruling was influenced by Louisiana lawsuits arising from the
same explosion, in which the Louisiana appellate court had not ruled on the choice-of-law
issue. See id. at 721, n.4. The opinion does not mention what choice-of-law analysis is
appropriate on remand. That is, it is not clear if the Sonat/Cudd agreement had a choice-
of-law clause or would be governed by the most significant relationship test.
138. Cudd Pressure Control, Inc. v. Sonat Exploration Co., 202 S.W.3d 901 (Tex.
App.-Texarkana 2006, no pet. h.).
139. Id. at 903-05.
140. Id. at 905-12.
141. See Princess Lida of Thurn & Taxis v. Thompson, 305 U.S. 456, 466 (1938).
142. 445 F.3d 771 (5th Cir. 2006).
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bank accounts. Federal courts in those states issued execution orders for
the Rhode Island judgment. In the meantime, the federal forfeiture ac-
tion led to a restraining order from a Dallas federal court against any
disbursement of those funds. The Rhode Island creditors moved for sum-
mary disposition and to vacate the restraining order so that their judg-
ment levies could be pursued. 143
To resolve the dispute, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals had to ex-
amine the levies under the law of each issuing state. Although federal
courts had issued the levies, federal courts use local state law for execu-
tion purposes. In separate analyses, the Fifth Circuit found that none of
the levies had established in rem control over the funds in such a way as
to divest the federal government's in rem seizure of the assets. 144 The
Fifth Circuit went on to hold that the restraining order had been improp-
erly issued because notice was not given to adverse parties-the Rhode
Island creditors-as required by federal law. 145 The Fifth Circuit denied
the civil creditors' attempted levies, vacated the restraining order, and
remanded for relitigation of a preliminary injunction, with proper notice
to the intervening creditors. 146
143. Id. at 777-78.
144. Id. at 783-85.
145. Id. at 789 (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 65(a)( 1) (West 1992)).
146. Id. at 793.
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